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The Constitutionality of Airport Searches 
It became clear in the late 1960's that the novel crime of airplane 
hijacking not only posed particularly grave dangers, but was also 
unusually difficult to prevent. An immediate and effective response 
was required. The current airport search system was developed to fill 
this need. Since it was instituted, the number of skyjackings has been 
greatly reduced,1 and most observers attribute this reduction to the 
effectiveness of the procedures. 
However, airport searches, which are not presently done under 
the authority of a warrant, may present problems under the fourth 
amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.2 
I. From 1961 through 1967, there were only seven air hijackings in the United 
States. In 1968, however, 18 American and 12 foreign airplanes were hijacked. In 1969, 
there were $0 hijacking attempts-of which 33 were successful-involving American 
airplanes and 46 attempts-of which 37 were successful-on foreign airplanes. Since 
1969, the number of hijackings has decreased each year. In 1970, there were only 26 
attempted hijackings-of which 18 were successful-in this country, and another 58 
attempts-with 38 successes-in the rest of the world. In 1971, America suffered 2'1 at• 
tempted hijackings-with only 12 successful-and there were 32 attempts-with 11 
successful-on foreign planes. McGinley &: Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A 
Reasonable Approach, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 293, 294-95 (1972). In 1972, there were 21 
attempted hijackings in this country-of which only 10 were successful-and there 
were 31 attempts-with 10 successes-in the rest of the world. As of November 1, 
there had been only 2 hijacking attempts in the United States in 1973, and only one of 
those succeeded. Telephone interview with Mr. David Hess, Information Specialist, 
News Division, FAA, November 27, 1973. 
2. In interpreting the fourth amendment the Supreme Court has ruled that, gen-
erally, "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a 
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). In addition to the amendment's requirements ol 
probable cause and particularity the warrant must be issued by "a neutral anll ck• 
tached magistrate." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
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The number of cases contesting the constitut,ionality of airport 
searches has greatly increased during the past year,3 but the courts 
have often failed to give the questions presented the careful analysis 
that they deserve. To date, most decisions, citing "the overwhelming 
societal ihterest created by the imminent danger of passenger 
deaths, "4 have held that the searches do not violate the fourth amend-
ment. 6 A few courts, however, have maintained that established 
search and seizure law simply cannot be stretched far enough to 
approve these searches in their present form.6 This Note will discuss 
airport searches in· comparison to several situations in which the 
courts have found that the requirements of the fourth amendment 
do not apply or are satisfied even in the absence of a warrant: border 
searches, administrative searches, stop-and-frisk searches, and searches 
under express or implied consent. None of these are perfectly anal-
ogous to the present airport procedures. Therefore, if airport searches 
are to be allowed, either the procedures must be modified to fit the 
established exceptions, or a new exception to the warrant require-
ment of the fourth amendment must be created. 
Airplane hijacking became a major problem in 1968,7 when there 
were eighteen successful attempts, and 1969, when there were forty 
attempts, thirty-three of which were successful.8 In response to this 
new danger, the government took both regulatory and legislative 
action. In late 1968, a special Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
3, In the federal courts, approximately 12 airport search cases were tried from 1969 
through 1972. From January through June 1973, another 11 airport search decisions 
have been reported, and there are almost certainly others that have not yet been pub-
lished. 
4. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1095 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
5. See, e.g., United States v. Legato, 42 U.S.L.W. 2019 (5th Cir., June 14, 1973); United 
States v. Riggs, 474 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S. Oct., 9, 
1973); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Epperson, 
454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972). 
6. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) (must show actual 
consent to search); United States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973) (search may be-
come unreasonable if its scope expands beyond what is reasonable considering its 
purposes); United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir, 1973) (must show com-
pelling circumstances to justify airport searches); United States v. Meulener, 351 F. 
Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (in order to prove consent must show defendant knew he 
could avoid the search by not boarding). 
Many observers are particularly concerned that fewer than 20 per cent of the arrests 
resulting from airport searches have involved crimes related to hijacking. N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 2, 1971, at 1, col. 3 (late city ed.). Over one third of the arrests not related to hi-
jacking were for possession of narcotics, approximately another one third involved 
aliens illegally in the United States, and the remainder were distributed among a wide 
variety of other offenses. 
7. After the first hijacking of an American commercial aircraft in 1961, see J . .AREY, 
THE SKY PIRATES 49-55 (1972), Congress passed a statute that, for the first time, made 
aircraft hijacking and certain related activities federal crimes. Act of Sept. 5, 1961, 
Pub. L. No. 87-197, § 1, 75 Stat, 466 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ I472(i)-(m) (1970)). 
8. McGinley &: Downs, supra note I, at 295. 
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Task Force, in cooperation with the commercial carriers, developed 
and implemented the initial antihijacking system,9 and the govern-
ment provided United States deputy marshals and customs agents 
to carry out the searches.10 In 1970, by special Presidential directive, 
the searches were extended to all "appropriate" airports.11 Participa-
tion in the search procedure had initially been voluntary on the part 
of the airlines, but on February I, 1972, the FAA issued a rule that 
required airlines to screen all commercial passengers themselves.12 
Most of the cases that have been decided to date arose under these 
early guidelines. Although the original system varied in its applica-
tion, it was essentially a series of increasingly intrusive and stringent 
screening procedures. In a typical search, airline personnel would 
first apply a Hijacker Profile, developed by a task force of representa-
tives from several federal agencies,13 to all passengers as they checked 
in, and special markings would be put on the tickets of the "selec-
tees."14 At the boarding gate, all passengers were required to walk 
through a magnetometer (metal detector); in some cases only the 
"selectees" were actually monitored.15 If a passenger triggered the 
device, airline personnel would ask for identification. If he failed to 
pro9-uce satisfactory identification, a marshal was summoned, who 
would repeat the request.16 The selectee would be asked if he were 
wearing .or carrying any metal and would then be asked to pass 
through the magnetometer a second time.17 Only if he again triggered 
the device would he be asked to submit to a "voluntary" frisk.18 The 
passenger's hand baggage might also be searched.19 Each successive 
intrusion was conditioned on the passenger's failure to satisfy the 
9. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 898-99 (9th Cir. 1973); Hearings on Aircraft 
Hijacking Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong,, 2d Sess, 80 
'(1970) [hereinafter Hearings]. 
IO. Hearings, supra note 9, at 80, 92. 
11. 1970 PUBLIC PAPERS OF PRF.5IDENTS OF 'rllE UNITED STATES: RICHARD NIXON 742-43 
(1971). 
12. 37 Fed. Reg. 2500-01 (1972) (codified at 14 C.F.R. § 121,538 (1973)). The new 
rule required air carriers to adopt a screening system "acceptable" to t11c FAA. Such 
a system would require tlie screening of all airline passengers "by one or more of 
tlie following systems: behavioral profile, magnetometer, identification check, physical 
search." FAA Press Release No. 72-26, Feb. 6, 1972. 
13. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). The details 
of tlie profile are secret, but tlie government has revealed that tlie characteristics arc 
based on a detailed study of all known hijackers. The characteristics are ostensibly 
concerned with tlie behavioral patterns of embarking passengers, rather than with 
any racial or social traits. 328 F. Supp, at 1086-87. 
14. McGinlcy &: Downs, supra note 1, at 303-04. 
15. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1973). 
16. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1083 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) . 
. 17; United States v; Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1083 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
18. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1083 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
19. United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1181 (3d Cir. 1972). 
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preceding check, and at each step the majority of the passengers were 
cleared for boarding without further search.20 
Hijacking attempts continued, although with reduced success,21 
and the FAA decided that more rigorous searches were necessary. On 
December 5, 1972, it ordered airlines to subject all passengers to a 
magnetometer screening and a search of carry-on items, as well as to 
the Hijacker Profile. The airlines were to conduct these searches with 
their own personnel or with private security guards, but armed law 
enforcement officers were to be present at all times.22 This new pro-
cedure abolished the successive screening that was the basis of the 
original system. No passenger was considered cleared until he had 
passed through all three stages. 
Before these procedures are evaluated in terms of the fourth 
amendment, it should be pointed out that two other constitutional 
problems may be raised in cases involving airport searches. First, 
when the validity of the profile is in question,23 the courts have used 
in camera hearings to ensure its continued secrecy.24 The defendant 
and the public are excluded from these hearings, although the de-
fendant's counsel is present. It has been alleged that this procedure 
denies the defendant his right to a public trial, his right to confronta-
20. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
21. See note I supra. 
22. Dept. of Transportation Press Release No. 103-72, Dec. 5, 1972. 
23. The courts have not even attempted to answer the question of whether the 
profile is accurate or effective if used correctly. In fact, approximately 14 out of every 
15 people who meet the profile and are searched are found to have no weapon. 
United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Also, one commentator 
has argued, there is always the risk that even a theoretically sound system will be 
misused: "[P]ermitting any use of certain mathematical methods entails a sufficiently 
high risk of misuse, or a risk of misuse sufficiently costly to avoid, that it would be 
irrational not to take such misuse into account when deciding whether to permit 
the methods to be employed at all." Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and 
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1329, 1331 (1971). 
24. See, e.g., United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. 
Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972). It can be argued that 
the profile violates the requirement of equal protection implicit in the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp, 1077, 
1087 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Since in camera hearings have maintained the secrecy of the 
characteristics used, it is impossible to determine whether they involve a suspect 
classification or whether they bear a rational relationship to the government's pur-
pose. However, at least one court that has held an in camera hearing on the subject 
has found that the distinctions made by the profile "do not discriminate against 
any group on the basis of religion, origin, political views, or race. They are precisely 
designed to select only those who present a high probability of being dangerous." 
United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Lopez, however, 
demonstrates that a secret profile can easily be abused. In that case, an airline official 
had, without authority, issued an order· that modified the profile and introduced an 
ethnic clement for which there was no experimental basis. Since defendant had been 
selected by this altered profile, the court held that his constitutional rights had been 
violated, suppressed the evidence found during the search, and dismissed the indict-
ment against him. 
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tion of the witnesses against him, and his right to the effective 
assistance of counsel, all of which are guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment.25 In determining if these rights have been unconstitutionally 
impaired, the courts look to the extent to which they have been 
infringed and the strength of the public interest involved in the 
activity called into question.26 The validity of the procedure has been 
upheld in airport search cases because of the "serious danger" that 
if "even one characteristic of the 'profile' [were] generally revealed, 
the system could be seriously undermined by hijackers fabricating an 
acceptable profile."27 In recent cases the scope of in camera proceed-
ings in airport search cases has been strictly limited in order to avoid 
unnecessary infringement on the defendant's rights.28 The courts 
have emphasized the fact that the earlier cases were justified only by 
the need to keep the profile secret and have reversed convictions 
where the in camera portions of the hearings dealt with subjects 
unrelated to the profile. 
A second constitutional objection that may be raised in relation 
to airport searches involves the right to travel.29 Although this right is 
not explicitly guaranteed by any provision of the Constitution,30 the 
Supreme Court has recognized that it is fundamental.31 In response 
to the charge that the right to travel is unconstitutionally infringed 
by the airport search system, it might first be argued that the search 
system does not burden travel unreasonably. This is not to say that 
travel must be completely prohibited before the right is infringed; 
the Court has stated that mere penalization is sufficient to make an 
infringement unconstitutional.82 For instance, the denial of welfare 
benefits to those who have not lived in a state for a year,88 and the 
25. For more extensive discussions of this problem, see United States v. Lopez, 
328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); McGinley &: Downs, supra note 1, at 316-
18; Note, Skyjackings: Constitutional Problems Raised by Anti-Hijacking Systems, 
63 J. CRIM, L. C, &: P. S. 356, 357-60 (1972). 
26. United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723, 725•26 (2d Cir. 1973); United States 
v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 672 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972); United States v. 
Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1087-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
27. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See also 
United States v. Miller, 480 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Slocum, 464 
F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972); United States V, Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 
409 U.S. 991 (1972). 
28. United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973); United States V, 
Clark, 475 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1973). 
--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~ 
(1972). 
30. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966). 
31. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618, 633-38 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966); Edwards v. Cali• 
fornia, 314 U.S. 160, 196-77 (1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43-44 
(1867). 
32. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338-42 (1972). 
33. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
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denial of the right to register to vote to those who have not resided 
in the state for one year and in the county for three months,34 have 
both been found to be impermissible burdens on the right to travel. 
It is unlikely, however, that the courts ·will find that the "minor ... 
indignity incident to an airport search"35 is a similarly unreasonable 
burden. The intrusion caused by the use of the magnetometer is 
"quite minimal,"36 as is that caused by the use of the profile, and 
"the inconvenience of a pat-dmm is so minor"37 that, as one court has 
suggested, the procedures are not "a resented intrusion on privacy, 
but, instead, a welcome reassurance of safety."38 Moreover, for those 
who find the airport search overly objectionable, other means of 
transportation are available. 39 
Even if the right to travel is found to be burdened, it would be 
argued that the infringement is constitutional in that it is justified 
by a compelling state interest.40 In a case involving the right to travel 
outside the country, the Courf analogized to the protected freedom 
to travel within the United States and pointed out that the right to 
travel "does not mean that areas ravaged by flood, fire or pestilence 
cannot be quarantined when it can be demonstrated that unlimited 
travel to the area would directly and materially interfere with the 
safety and welfare of the area or the Nation as a whole."41 The airport 
searches constitute a smaller imposition on the traveling public than 
34. Dunn v. Blumstein, 45 U.S. 330 (1972). 
35. United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 51 (5th Cir. 1973). 
36. United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723, 729 (2d Cir. 1973). 
37. United States v. Rivera, 72 CR 1309, slip op. at 10 (E.D.N.Y., May 22, 1973). 
38. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 
U.S. 947 (1972). Some courts have viewed the search procedures differently. "[T]he 
intrusion which the airport search imposes on the public is not insubstantial. It is 
inconvenient and annoying, in some cases it may be embarrassing, and at times it can 
be incriminating." United States v. Skipwith, No. 72-1932, slip op. at 6 (5th Cir., 
June 14, 1973). The Skipwith court did ultimately conclude that the searches were 
justifiable. 
39. "There is no inherent right to travel to a certain place in a particular air-
craft." United States v. Fern, No. 72-1284, slip op. at 7 (7th Cir., Sept. 20, 1973) 
(Gordon, J., dissenting). It can be argued that Judge Gordon overstates the law. 
Some commentators view the right to travel as a right of personal mobility. See, e.g., 
z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTlTUTION OF 1787, at 188-93 (1956). To 
the extent that airport searches deter people from using airplanes, they would seem 
to restrict an individual's mobility. 
40. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 333, 338-42 (1972). The first Supreme Court 
case that strictly scrutinized governmental action and found it justified by a finding 
of a compelling interest was Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In that 
case, national security provided a compelling federal interest. Recently, in Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973), the Court explicitly found that the state has a 
compelling interest in the life of a mother after three months of pregnancy and in 
the fetus after it attains viability. Dicta in another recent case, In re Griffiths, 41 
U.S.L.W. 5143, 5145 (U.S., June 25, 1973), suggests that a state may have a com-
pelling interest in maintaining the high standards of its legal profession. 
41. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1965). 
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does an absolute quarantine, and they do serve similar interests in 
that they protect the welfare and safety of American citizens. The 
possible loss of life and property, especially when measured against 
the minor inconvenience of airport searches, seem sufficient to consti-
tute a compelling governmental interest in conducting airport 
searches. As one court concluded: "Any suggestion that the defen-
dant's constitutional right to travel has been improperly interfered 
with would be amusing in other circumstances. We are trying to 
assure that right for the public and the resulting inconvenience for 
the few should at least be tolerable."42 
The objections raised under the sixth amendment and the right 
to travel have not been considered seriously by the courts, but have 
been dismissed rather perfunctorily.43 A much more difficult problem 
is posed by the prohibitions of the fourth amendment. The prelim-
inary question is whether the fourth amendment applies to airport 
searches, which are typically conducted by private employees in a 
public place and do not involve an intrusion into the office or home 
of the person searched. In many respects the Court's interpretation 
of the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches 
and seizures is unclear.44 There is general agreement, however, that 
its fundamental purpose is "to safeguard the privacy and security 
of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials."46 
Early interpretations emphasized that the amendment prohibited 
governmental intrusions into "the sanctity of a man's home and 
privacies of life."46 Over the years, however, the interpretation has 
been expanded. The Supreme Court has now concluded that the 
amendment "protects people, not places"47 and rejected the idea that 
42. United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 
(1972). It must be remembered that the right to travel is an individual right. How• 
ever, in light of the potential loss of life and property that airport searches prevent, 
there is ample governmental interest in conducting airport searches. 
•~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~a~ 
991 (1972). 
44. Even the Supreme Court admitted in one recent fourth amendment case that 
"(o]f course, it would be nonsense to pretend that our decision today reduces Fourth 
Amendment law to complete order and harmony. The decisions of the Court over the 
years point in differing directions and differ in emphasis. No trick of logic will make 
them all perfectly consistent." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971). 
45. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
46. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). The Court has stated that the 
essence of the offense against the fourth amendment 
[i]s not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers ••• but 
it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, 
and private property •••• Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers 
are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of 
a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict 
him of a crime or forfeit his goocfs, is within the condemnation of that judgment, 
In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other. 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
47. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
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a "search" is limited to physical intrusions into the area to be 
searched.48 The Court has also recognized that the fourth amendment 
may protect an individual's justifiable expectations of privacy even 
in an area accessible to the public.49 
The frisks and the inspection of hand baggage are clearly' covered 
by the term "search" as defined for fourth amendment purposes. 
There may still be a question as to whether the term is appropriately 
applied to the use of the profile and the magnetometer alone. It is 
difficult to argue that the use of the hijacker profile constitutes a 
search in and of itself, since it involves no physical intrusion.50 Sim-
ilarly, although the magnetometer detects the presence of metal on 
or about the passenger's body, there is no physical contact with 1;lie 
passenger.51 However, several cases have now held that the use of the 
magnetometer alone does constitute a search -within the meaning of 
the fourth amendment. 52 In nonairport-search cases the ~ourts have 
accepted the idea that electronic eavesdropping with no physical 
intrusion may constitute a search where the individual has a re_as~m-
able expectation of privacy;53 the use of the magnetometer is a similar 
electronic surveillance. However, since the use of the magnetometer 
is less intrusive than more traditional searches, the courts· have found 
that its use may b~ justified on less stringent grounds.54 
Nor should the fact that private persons may be involved in con-
ducting airport searches exempt the searches from fourth 'amendment 
coverage. It is true that the amendment's "origin and history clearly 
show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of 
sovereign authority, and was not intended to pe a limitation upon 
other than government agencies."55 When federal agents are _dir_ectly 
involved, even if the search is conducted jointly with airline per-
48. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
49. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). 
50. United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1183 (3d Cir. 1972). One cause for con7 
cern, however, is that the too-ready acceptance of the use of the profile; mig,ht, · if 
carried to its logical extreme, serve as a precedent to justify using statistical methods 
to predict who might commit a crime, so that such individuals could be arrested in 
advance and preventively detained. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, HOO 
(E.D.N.Y. 1971). See also United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 676 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 991 (1972) (Mansfield, J., concurring). 
51. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1085 (E.D.N.Y •. 1971). 
52. E.g., United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, ll82 (3d Cir. 1972); United States 
v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972). 
53. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967): "rrJhe reach of [the Fourth] 
Amendment cannot tum upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into 
any given enclosure.'' ' 
54. United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1972); United States, v. 
Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972). 
55. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). These now include not only federal, 
but also state governmental agencies, because the fourth amendment has been in-
corporated into the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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sonnel or private security guards, the courts will clearly regard it as 
involving state action,56 and when the government's involvement in a 
particular search is merely "peripheral" that also should be sufficient 
to qualify it as a government search for the purposes of the fourth 
amendment,57 for the search procedures were not only developed 
56, Corngold v. United States, 267 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966). 
57. United States v. Guest, 282 U.S. 745, 755·56 (1966). The existence of govern-
mental action has been extensively discussed in cases involving airline freight or 
package service. See, e.g., Clayton v. United States, 413 F,2d 297 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. 
denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970); Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967); United 
States v. :Blum, 329 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964); United States V, 
Thoreson, 281 . F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Cal. 1967), revd. on other grounds, 428 F.2d 654 
(9th Cir. 1972). These cases may be read to suggest that federal agents must actively 
instigate, initiate, or participate in a particular search in order for it to be governed 
by the fourth amendment. However, they can be distinguished from the antihijacking 
passenger search situation because they all involved searches of freight or of packages 
shipped with common carriers who had explicitly reserved the right to inspect any-
thing that they transported. 
Two cases have found that no government action was involved in airport searches, 
In United States v. Mitchell, 252 F. Supp. 28 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), the court simply asserted 
that 
[a]irport "search" cases hardly invoke Fourth Amendment standards. The context 
is not basically a citizen-to-government context, and invocation of the Fourth 
Amendment appears as an almost gratuitous consequence of the presence in the 
background of governmental air safety regulation and of the governmental 
provision at airports of :peace officers to apprehend people found actually com• 
mitting or attempting cnmes. The real problem is to assure the safe transit of 
private persons on privately owned aircraft. 
352 F. Supp. at 42. No judicial or statutory support is offered for this analysis. 
A second case, United States v. Wilkerson, 478 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1978), offers a 
more sophisticated statement of this position. In that case, a young woman purchased 
a ticket in San Diego to travel on a flight to St. Louis. She checked two bags and 
then asked directions to the restroom. After the plane had left the loading gate, 
officials discovered that she had never boarded. Since airline regulations require that a 
passenger accompany his checked baggage and since the woman had partially fit the 
hijacker profile, the plane was recalled, and the two bags were searched by airline 
employees; plastic bags containing vegetable matter were discovered. Police officers 
were called in, and it was ascertained that the bags contained marijuana. The luggage 
was shipped to St. Louis, and defendant was arrested there when he picked them up. 
In this case, the court relied on two other cases that it bad recently decided and 
asserted that "[t]hese tw·o cases stand for the proposition that searches of luggage by 
airline employees are private searches that are invulnerable to fourth amendment 
attack so long as the searches are conducted by the carrier for its own purpose and 
without the instigation or participation of government officers." 478 F.2d at 815, citing 
United States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3195 
(U.S., Oct. 9, 1972), and United States v. :Burton, 475 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1972). 
It is not clear that the search in Wilkerson was conducted solely "by the carrier 
for its own purpose." Judge Heaney, concurring on the ground that there was probable 
cause for the search, pointed out: 
As of March 9, 1972, each airline was required to adopt a security program with 
respect to checked baggage •••• These regulations which were in effect when 
this search was made but not when the Echols and Burton searches were made 
remove any doubt as to the government's involvement in this search. Even though 
the search here was conducted by airline personnel, it was carried out at the 
instigation and direction of the government •••• 
478 F.2d at 816-17. In addition, both Echols and Burton are distinguishable on their 
facts. In Echols, an airline employee, acting pursuant to airline regulations, opened 
an unclaimed suitcase, solely for the purpose of identifying the owner. In Burton, au 
airline ticket agent became suspicious because the defendant fit the hijacker profile 
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and implemented with government assistance, but are also required 
by FAA regulation. 58 
Once it is determined that the airport searches are subject to the 
fourth amendment, the court must determine if they are permissible 
within the terms of the amendment. The general rule in this area is 
"that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established 
and well-delineated exceptions."59 Searches that fall within the ex-
ceptions must still be reasonable, although they are not subject to 
the requirement that a warrant be procured upon a showing of 
probable cause.00 There are, of course, no warrants involved in 
airport antihijacking searches as the system now exists; the nature of 
the procedure is such that there is no time in which to procure them. 
Further, even if there were time, in most situations the airport 
officials could not meet the level of probable cause required for a 
normal search warrant, since the only evidence available before the 
magnetometer is employed would be the £act that the passengers 
had met the profile. This fact in itself is not "sufficient ... to warrant 
a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense . . . is being 
committed, "61 for fewer than one in fifteen of those selected by the 
profile have proved to be carrying weapons.62 
Many of the existing exceptions to the warrant requirement 
clearly have no relevance to airport searches. For instance, a search 
incident to a lawful arrest is constitutional without a warrant, pro-
vided that it is limited to the arrestee's person and the area within 
his immediate control.63 However, an airport search typically involves 
no arrest at all. If an arrest does take place it is preceded by and 
caused by the search, a relationship that is insufficient to justify the 
search as "incident to a lawful arrest."64 It could be argued that the 
antihijacking search itself constitutes a temporary arrest, especially 
when it includes a search of hand-baggage or a frisk. No court has 
ruled on the point, but the search would not appear to meet the 
comm.on standards for arrest, which require that the detention be 
"performed with the intention to effect an arrest, and [be] so under-
stood by the person detained."65 
and because the weight distribution of one of his checked bags seemed unusual. On 
his own initiative, the agent obtained a skeleton key and opened the bags, where he 
discovered the contraband. 
58. See text accompanying notes 9-12 &: 22 supra. 
59, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
60. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). 
61. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967). 
62. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
63. Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
64. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-63 (1968). 
65. Jenkins v. United States, 161 F.2d 99, 101 (10th Cir. 1947). 
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Other exceptions to the warrant requirement that were made for 
certain exigent circumstances seem similarly inapplicable. For in-
stance, no visible offense that might justify a search66 is being com-
mitted in the presence of a police officer. Nor can airport searches 
be justified as incident to the "hot pursuit" of a fleeing felon. 61 There 
is no danger that necessary evidence will be destroyed before a war-
rant can be procured.68 Nor can airport searches be assimilated into 
the exception for inventory searches, which are conducted by the 
police after an arrest in order to account for the suspect's belongings.00 
There are four other situations in ,vhich a warrantless search may be 
allowed, all of which have been suggested as possible grounds for 
approving the present airport search system. 
I 
Border searches, which are typically conducted without a warrant, 
do not constitute an exception to the warrant requirement of the 
fourth amendment; they have never been viewed as subject to the 
limits of the fourth amendment at all. Since 1789, customs officials 
have been authorized by statute to search, without a warrant or a 
specific demonstration of probable cause, anyone entering the United 
States.70 The Court has reasoned that, since the authorizing statute 
was passed by the same Congress that proposed the Bill of Rights 
for ratification by the states, border searches were never intended 
to be included within the prohibition of the amendment.71 In Witt 
v. United States,72 the ninth circuit, following this reasoning, held 
that there was reasonable and probable cause to search every person 
entering the United States by reason of that entry alone. In a later 
case, the same court found that a border search need not be based on 
probable cause; "unsupported" or "mere" suspicion was found 
sufficient. 73 
The rationale of the border search cases is not directly applicable 
66. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
67. See Warden v. Hayden, 378 U.S. 294 (1967). 
68. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
69. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1966). 
70. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 43. Currently, custt,.wll officials arc 
allowed "to conduct a search, without warrant, of the person, and of the personal 
effects in the possession of any person seeking admission to the United States, con• 
cerning whom [such official] may have reasonable cause to suspect that grounds e.xist 
for exclusion from the United States •••• " 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) (1970), Sec generally 
Note, In Search of the Border: Searches Conducted by Federal Customs and Immigra-
tion Officers, 4 N.Y.U. J. INTL. L. &: POL. 93 (1972). 
71. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886). 
72. 287 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1961). 
73, Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 
977 (1966). 
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to antihijacking searches, for the border search procedures are used 
to search people before they enter the United States; they could not 
be used to screen people who board planes within the United States 
and who do not intend to cross any national borders. However, on a 
policy level, there are many similarities between airport searches and 
border searches. The special standards applied to border searches are 
"based on policy considerations which recognize the difficult prob-
lems of effectively policing ... national boundaries"74 and the over-
riding public interest in preventing contraband and illegal aliens 
from entering the country.75 The marshals that assist in airport 
searches probably incur even greater policing problems with regard 
to time and urgency than do customs officials, and the public interest 
in stopping air piracy is certainly as compelling as that in protecting 
the borders. 
In a recent line of cases, the fifth circuit has upheld airport 
searches by analogizing to border searches. Initially, in a case involv-
ing the search of a person who had not yet reached the boarding area, 
the court merely mentioned that the gravity of the danger in the 
two situations was analogous.76 More recently, the court explicitly 
accepted border search standards as appropriate to airport searches 
when the person searched has actually presented himself for board-
ing; in United States v. Skipwith,77 the court held that "the standards 
for initiating a search of a person at the boarding gate should be no 
more stringent than those applied in border crossing situations."78 
74. Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1967). 
75. Historically, this broad power has been limited to searches of people entering 
the country. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). There is no provision covering 
travelers who remain within the United States, and there is confusion concerning 
people leaving the country. According to one commentator, the Chief of Customs 
Control at Kennedy Airport claimed that the Munitions Act, 22 U.S.C. § 40l(a) (1970), 
and the Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (expired Dec. 31, 1969), em-
powered customs officials to search all departing international travelers. Note, Airport 
Security Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 71 C_ouJM. L. REv. 1039, 1051 (1971). 
In United States v. Marti, 321 F. Supp. 59 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), the court concluded that 
warrantless "exit searches" are permissible under the fourth amendment, but that 
probable cause is required to justify them. The court referred to the "strong national 
interest in providing a reasonable yet effective" way of searching the baggage of 
departing passengers because of the "current terror attacks and hijackings of civil 
aircraft." 321 F. Supp. at 65. 
76. United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973). The defendant in the 
case had been found with heroin during an airport search. The court upheld the 
search on an e.xtension of the stop-and-frisk rule announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968). See text accompanying notes 105-11 infra. However, in the course of its 
discussion, the court noted the similarities between the airport search and the 
border search, which has "always been exempt from the usual fourth amendment 
requirements." 475 F.2d at 51 &: n.8. The court added however, that "[o]ur discussion 
of border searches is by way of analogy. We do not propose to substitute the 'sus-
picion standard' applicable in border search cases for the Terry v. Ohio standard 
which is the basis for our decision." 475 F.2d at 51 n.8. 
77. No. 72-1932 (5th Cir., June 14, 1973) (excerpted in 42 U.S.L.W. 2018). 
78. No. 72-1932, slip op. at 7. 
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The court weighed three factors in determining whether a standard 
less strict than the usual requirement that probable cause be demon-
strated was appropriate. First, it noted that the public need to prevent 
air piracy is "judicially-recognized."79 Second, it indicated that the 
procedures appear to be "the most efficacious that could be used."80 
Third, the court insisted that the degree of intrusion into the privacy 
of the person made by airport and border searches was far less 
offensive than that made by similar searches in other contexts, al-
though it still represented a not insubstantial burden on the travel-
ling public. The court pointed out that there is no social or moral 
stigma attached to a search at a boarding gate and that the individuals 
searched have entered the search area voluntarily and with knowledge 
that they would be searched.81 The court also argued that the public 
and supervised nature of airport searches and the desire of the airline 
companies to avoid harassment of and inconvenien.;e to their pas-
sengers further minimize the possibility of abuse. The Skipwith 
court concluded that it is reasonable to allow searches of "those who 
actually present themselves for boarding on an air carrier, like those 
seeking entrance into the country," on the basis of "mere or unsup-
ported suspicion. "82 
Skipwith overlooks the fact that, although the analogy between 
border and airport searches may be close and the policy considera-
tions quite similar, the border search doctrine was originally based 
on specific legislation that indicated that the framers of the fourth 
amendment did not intend to require a warrant for such searches. 
The exception was not simply established by judicial fiat. Moreover, 
the Constitution restricts the ability of government to limit interstate 
travel, 83 which is involved in most airport searches, while it does 
permit extensive regulation of travel into84 or out of the country,8G 
which is involved in border searches. Almeida-Sanchez v. United 
79. No. 72-1932, slip op. at 6. 
80. No. 72-1932, slip op. at 6. 
81. No. 72-1932, slip op. at 6-7. The court stressed that the search was not "cx.-
traordinary or unexpected" because "Skipwith came to the specific part of the air• 
port where he knew or should have known all citizens were subject to being searched," 
No. 72-1932, slip op. at 4. 
82. No. 72-1932, slip op. at 8. 
83. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972): Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
84. The power of Congress to deal with foreign affairs, which is inherent in the 
sovereignty of the United States, supports the many immigration laws that regulate 
the entry, sojourn, and departure of aliens. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 
(1954); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AND THE CONSTlTtJTION 74-75 (1972). 
85. The right of Congress to regulate travel out of the country by passing a statute 
that makes it illegal for a United States citizen to leave the country without a valid 
passport is also rooted in the power of Congress to enact legislation to regulate 
foreign affairs. See Worthy v. United States, 328 F.2d 386, 393 (5th Cir. 1964). 
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States,86 a 1973 Supreme Court decision regarding border searches, 
stresses the strict limitations of the original exception and refuses to 
extend them. It is unlikely that many lower courts will, so soon after 
the Supreme Court's admonition, follow Skipwith in extending the 
rela."<ed border search standards to airport searches. 
Congress may be willing to pass legislation-similar to that au-
thorizing reduced standards for border searches-that expressly ex-
empts airport searches from the requirements of procuring a warrant 
or demonstrating probable cause. Such legislation would not have the 
presumption of validity contained in the original border search law 
because it would not have been adopted contemporaneously with 
the fourth amendment. As a result, any legislation is likely to be no 
more than a futile attempt to modify a constitutional prohibition 
by statute. 
II 
In certain situations that are admittedly subject to the fourth 
amendment the Court has carved out exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement upon a showing that a compelling governmental interest 
exists and that a warrant cannot be obtained without frustrating the 
purpose of the search. However, the Court has " 'specifically estab-
lished' and '. . . jealously and carefully drawn' "87 the purpose and 
scope of each exception. The facts in each case must be carefully 
scrutinized to determine whether they are sufficiently similar to the 
facts upon which the Supreme Court focused in authorizing the 
original exception. 
Administrative searches, such as fire, health, and safety inspec-
tions, used to be considered to be a general exception to the warrant 
requirement.88 In the 1967 case of Camara v. Municipal Court,89 
however, the Supreme Court considerably limited the right of gov-
ernment officials to conduct administrative searches without a war-
rant. 00 In that case the Court, for the first time, expressly used a 
86. 41 U.S.L.W. 4970 (U.S., June 21, 1973). 
87. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971), quoting Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) and Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). 
88. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). 
89. 387 U.S. 523 (1957). 
90. The appellant had refused to allow city building inspectors to enter his apart-
ment without a warrant. As a result, the city brought criminal charges against him 
for violating the housing code by refusing to permit a legitimate inspection. While 
awaiting trial, he petitioned for a writ of prohibition, arguing that the ordinance 
authorizing warrantless inspections was unconstitutional on its face as a violation 
of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. In its decision the Supreme Court specifi-
cally overruled Frank v. Maryland and ruled that under the facts as alleged peti-
tioner's writ should be granted. The Court held that under the fourth amendment 
defendant had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors procure a search 
warrant. 
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balance-of-interests analysis to decide a fourth amendment question. 
Weighing governmental necessity against the citizen's right to pri-
vacy, the Court held that a lessee could insist that a warrant be 
produced for an inspection of his apartment, even though the inspec-
tion was conducted for a legitimate governmental purpose. However, 
the probable cause standard that would make such a search "reason-
able" was "reduced" from that used in the ordinary criminal case: 
The court would be allowed to consider the general condition of the 
neighborhood, rather than merely the condition of the particular 
building, in determining if probable cause to search exists. Further-
more, the Court indicated that in emergency situations, where the 
government interest is sufficiently urgent or the delay occasioned by 
obtaining the warrant would frustrate the proper purpose, of the 
search, a warrantless administrative search would still be permis-
sible. 91 
In three recent cases, the Court indicated certain factors that 
might lead it, despite the Camara rule, to approve an administrative 
search in the absence of a warrant. In Colonnade Catering Corp. 
v. United States,92 the Court found that, in an industry that, like the 
liquor industry, has a long, history of federal regulation, Congress 
has broad powers to "fashion standards of reasonableness"93 with 
regard to searches. In Colonnade, however, Congress had made the 
imposition of a fine the exclusive sanction for refusal to permit entry 
for inspection and did not authorize forcible entry without a warrant. 
In United States v. Biswell,94 the premises searched without a war-
rant were the storeroom of a licensed gun deale1 In upholding the 
search, the Court found that, although "[f]ederal regulation of the 
interstate traffic in firearms is not as deeply rooted in history as is 
governmental. control of the liquor industry, . . . close scrutiny of 
this traffic is undeniably of central importance to federal efforts to 
prevent violent crime and to assist the States in regulating the fire-
arms traffic within their borders."95 It also noted that the intrusion 
on the individual's privacy was not objectionable, for the dealer had 
chosen to enter the business with knowledge of the mandatory in-
spection procedures. 96 
91. 387 U.S. at 538-39. For a perceptive !lnalysis of the halting development of this 
interests-balancing approach, see Greenberg,· The Balance of Intel'ests Theory and the 
Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and 
See, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1011 (1973). Greenberg argues that the balancing test approach 
introduced in Camara and Terry has great potential for resolving difficult fourth 
amendment questions, but he points out that the Supreme Court haS failed to use 
it since those two cases. 
92. 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
93. 397 U.S. at 77. 
94. 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
95. 406 U.S. at 315. 
96. 406 U.S. at 316. 
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In Wyman v. ]ames,91 the plaintiff, a former recipient of Aid-to-
Families-with-Dependent-Children payments, contested a state law 
that conditioned the receipt of future benefits on the recipient's 
consent to periodic home visits by caseworkers. The question of the 
validity of the visits was not raised directly, for when plaintiff refused 
to allow them, no forcible entry was made; instead, her welfare 
benefits were terminated. The Court held that the home visits were 
not "searches" ·within the meaning of the fourth amendment, but 
were merely of an interview nature.98 However, it also concluded 
that the visits would not be proscribed by the fourth amendment as 
"unreasonable" even if they were "searches."99 The warrant require-
ment was found inappropriate, for it "necessarily would imply con-
duct either criminal or out of compliance with an asserted governing 
standard."100 In determining whether the visit in ·question was rea-
sonable under fourth amendment standards the Court considered 
the purpose of the visit (which was not to get criminal information, 
but to ensure that the government's objective of benefiting the child 
was being served), the efficacy of alternative means of accomplishing 
that purpose, the degree of intrusion on the homeowner's rights, and 
the widespread use of the practice in other states.101 
A few recent decisions have upheld the constitutionality of airport 
searches on the basis of administrative search standards, pointing out 
that both are conducted as part of general regulatory schemes in 
furtherance of legitimate administrative purposes.102 However, the 
analogy does not appear to be appropriate. If the Camara rule were 
to be applied, the present airport search system would not meet its 
standards. No provision is presently made to obtain a warrant if one 
is demanded, and the delay occasioned by obtaining a warrant would 
effectively frustrate the purpose of the search, which is to promote 
the smooth and uninterrupted progress of safe air travel. If a warrant 
is sought, even the Camara stancfard of "reduced" probable cause will 
not be met. In the current inspection system, all passengers are 
searched by magnetometer; no evidence is produced that would indi-
cate that violations of the law might exist in the "area" or group 
searched. If the profile were still used as a screening device, it might 
meet the Camara standard, but even under the original airport search 
system the profile was not used to support the issuing of a warrant. 
Nor do the airport searches fall within the exceptions to the 
Camara rule suggested by the later cases. The relaxed requirements 
97. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
98. 400 U.S. at 317-18. 
99. 400 U.S. at 318. 
100. 400 U.S. at 324 •. 
101. 400 U.S. at 317-24. 
102. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908-12 (9th Cir. 1973). 
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of all three post-Camara cases discussed above were specifically out-
lined in statutes. The airport system, in contrast, is required, not by 
legislation, but by regulations promulgated by a federal agency. 
Moreover, Colonnade and Biswell involve the inspection of busi-
nesses with a long history of government regulation. The aviation 
industry has been regulated almost since its inception, but the indi-
vidual whose privacy is invaded by the search is not the regulated 
businessman, as in Colonnade and Biswell, but merely a passenger, 
who has not chosen "to engage in [a] pervasively regulated business 
. . . with the knowledge that [he] will be subject to effective inspec-
tion."103 The airport searches are not similar to the welfare visits in 
Wyman, for the former are primarily intended to gather information 
relating to criminal activity and are thus more likely to lead to 
criminal prosecution than are the welfare visits. Also, the scope of the 
airport search extends to the individual's person and in this respect 
is more intrusive than an inspection of a room or a dwelling. 
It could be suggested that airport searches fit into the exception 
for emergency situations left open in Camara. The system now in use 
cannot be so justified, however, for it is part of an ongoing regulatory 
process and is not limited to emergency circumstances. 
III 
Most of the cases104 that have upheld the airport search proce-
dures have relied on a broad interpretation of the "stop-and-frisk" 
doctrine enunciated in Terry v. Ohio.105 Terry dealt with the ad-
missibility of evidence found in the course of a stop and frisk rather 
than with the validity of the search itself, but, as the Court said, "A 
ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial . . . has the necessary 
effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence.''100 
103. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972). 
104. See, e.g., United States v. Legato, 42 U.S.L.W. 2019 (5th Cir., June 14, 1973); 
United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Slocum, 464 
F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972): United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
406 U.S. 947 (1972); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); United 
States v. Ware, 315 F. Supp. 1333 (D.C. Okla. 1970). 
105. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, an experienced police officer observed Terry and 
one of his codefendants walking up and down a street, peering intently into one 
particular store window, and then meeting to talk at a street corner where they were 
joined by the other defendant. The officer suspected that they were planning a robbery 
and thought that they might be armed; he approached the three men, identified him• 
self as a police officer, and asked for their names. They "mumbled something," and the 
officer grabbed Terry, spun him around, and patted down his clothing. He felt a 
bulge in the coat pocket, which proved to be a pistol. Terry was charged with carrying 
a concealed weapon, and at trial he moved to suppress the gun as evidence discovered 
incident to an illegal search. The trial court denied Terry's motion and found him 
guilty. That decision was sustained by an Ohio intermediate court, the Ohio supreme 
court, and the United States Supreme Court. 
106. 392 U.S. at 13. 
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The Court found that an investigatory stop and a limited frisk 
(patting down the outer clothing of a person for weapons) is justified 
when a police officer "has reason to believe that he is dealing with 
an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has 
probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime."107 The Court 
stressed that no frisk could be justified on the basis of mere "inar-
ticulate hunches"108 and that the searching officer would have "to 
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts [would] reasonably warrant [the] 
intrusion."109 In determining that the "reasonableness" requirement 
had been satisfied, the Court used a balancing test as it had in eval-
uating the degree of probable cause required in Camara. The Terry 
Court admitted that even a frisk constituted a serious invasion of 
personal privacy, 110 but it felt that the search was justified in the 
circumstances by the interest of the individual policeman in pro-
tecting himself and others from imminent harm.m 
In Adams v. Williams,112 the latest stop-and-frisk case, the Court 
has apparently relaxed the requirement that "specific and articulable 
facts" be shmrn. Approving a stop and frisk that was conducted 
entirely on the basis of a tip from an unidentified informant known 
to the officer,113 the Court said that the officer had "ample reason to 
fear for his safety" because the investigation occurred in a high crime 
area in the early morning when the officer was alone on patrol.114 
The first case that extended the stop-and-frisk doctrine to airport 
searches was United States v. Lindsey.115 Although the search in 
question occurred in an airport and was carried out by a special air 
marshal, neither the profile nor the magnetometer was used. Rather, 
defendant was questioned because his nervous and unusual behavior 
in the boarding lounge aroused the suspicions of the marshal and 
the ticket clerk. 116 The court held that, although "the level of sus-
107. 392 U.S. at 27. 
108. 392 l.T.S. at 22. 
109, 392 U.S. at 21. 
110. 392 U.S. at 24-25. 
111. 392 U.S. at 24, 27. In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), a companion 
case to Terry, the Court underscored the limited nature of the stop-and-frisk excep• 
tion to the warrant requirement. The circumstances in that case were very similar 
to those in Terry, but the Court held the contraband seized inadmissible because 
the search was clearly motivated by the officer's desire to discover drugs, rather than 
by his need for self-protection. 
112, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
113. 407 U.S. at 144-45. 
114. 407 U.S. at 147-48. 
115, 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972). 
116. The defendant gave a different name than that which appeared on his ticket. 
When the marshal asked him for identification, he produced two cards, in two other 
names. The marshal observed bulges in the defendant's coat pockets and, fearing 
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picion in the instant case is lower than in Terry, it was sufficiently 
high to justify" the limited, protective; pat-down search in view of 
the possible danger of a airline hijacking and the limited time in 
which the marshal had to act.117 These circumstances would seem 
to meet the requirement of "specific and articulable facts." 
United States v. Lopez118 was the first case to hold that the use 
of the profile and the magnetometer to justify the frisking of a 
passenger is constitutional under the Terry rationale. The court 
stressed the effectiveness of the search procedures, the compelling 
interest of the government in preventing hijackings, and the fact 
that the Terry rule allows an officer to perform a frisk" 'in the belief 
that his safety or that of others [is] in danger.' "119 Although the 
marshal in this case may not have been in any danger himself if the 
defendant had been allowed to board, he was presumably performing 
the frisk with the intention of protecting the other passengers.120 
The court pointed out that "the probability that any person who is 
selected to be frisked has a weapon is approximately 6%," a propor-
tion that it concluded was sufficient to justify the frisk in the con-
text of the great danger of hijacking.121 · 
Lopez expressly did not discuss whether "the use of the mag-
netometer might be an objectionable intrusion were it not accom-
panied by an antecedent warning from the profile indicating a need 
to focus particular attention on the subject."122 This question was 
answered in United States v. Epperson,123 where the defendant was 
frisked solely because he activated the magnetometer. The fourth 
that the defendant might be armed, frisked him, and discovered packets of heroin. 
451 F.2d at 702-03. 
117. 451 F.2d at 703. 
118. 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). After the defendant was selected by airline 
employees · as one who fit the hijacker profile, had activated the magnetometer as 
he passed through it, and had failed to produce identification upon request, federal 
marshals were summoned. When defendant again activated the magnetometer, again 
failed to produce any identification, and admitted that the name on his ticket was 
erroneous, the marshal frisked him for weapons. The marshal felt a hard bulge, large 
enough to be a pistol. It proved to be an envelope tightly packed with heroin. Lopez 
was arrested and charged with concealing and transporting narcotics. 328 F. Supp. at 
1081-82. The court found that the antihijacking search system used was highly effective 
and held that it was not unconstitutional. However, they found that, in this particular 
instance, an airline official had, without authority, issued an order modifying the 
profile by adding an ethnic element for which there was no experimental basis. Since 
the defendant might have been selected by this altered profile, the court held that 
his constitutional rights had been violated. They therefore granted his motion to 
suppress and dismissed the indictment against him. 328 F. Supp. at 1101,02. See dis-
cussion in note 24 supra. 
119. 328 F. Supp. at 1096, quoting 392 U.S. at 27. 
120. 328 F. Supp. at 1097. 
121. 328 F. Supp. at 1097. 
122. 328 F. Supp. at IIOO. 
123. 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972). 
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circuit held that the use of a magnetometer did constitute a "search" 
under the fourth amendment, but that, under the Terry doctrine, 
the search was reasonable. It suggested that the warrant requirement 
was set aside in Terry because of the limited scope and purpose of 
the search, the element of danger, and the necessity for swift action; 
the court found this case similar in that "[t]he danger is so well-
known, the governmental interest so overwhelming, and the inva~ion 
of privacy so minimal, that the warrant requirement is excused by 
exigent national circumstances."124 
In his concurring opinion in United States v. Bell,125 Judge 
Friendly of the second circuit court of appeals relied on Terry and 
suggested that the great danger from hijacking would in itself justify 
as reasonable not only the use of the magnetometer, but also more 
intrusive searches: 
I would not wish us to be understood as implying that searches of 
airplane passengers are lawful only . . . where a person first meets 
a "profile," ... and then activates a magnetometer ... · 
... When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives 
and millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blow-
ing up of a large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of rea-
sonableness, so long as the search is conducted in good faith for the 
purpose of preventing hijacking ... and with reasonable scope and 
the passenger has been given advance notice of his liability to such 
a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.126 
This view has not as yet found wide acceptance; Judge Mansfield 
concurred separately for the express purpose of disagreeing with 
Judge Friendly's position: 
I do not share the view that [airplane hijacking] justifies a broad and 
intensive search of all passengers, measured only by the good faith of 
those conducting the search, regardless of the absence of grounds for 
suspecting that the passengers searched are potential hijackers. 
. • . [T]he ultimate strength of our constitutional guarantees lies 
in their unhesitating application in times of crisis and tranquility 
alike.121 
The district court in United States v. Mitchell128 drew from 
Judge Friendly's concurrence authority for its conclusion that the 
fourth amendment was not applicable to airport searches ab~ent a 
showing that the search in question was motivated by a governmental 
interest in detecting crime, rather than a private interest in airplane 
safety. The court said that 
124. 454 F.2d at 771. 
125. 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972). 
126. 464 F.2d at 674-75. 
127. 464 F.2d at 675-76. 
128. 352 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
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the profile and magnetometer checks are not circumstances substi-
tuting for probable cause authorizing a Fourth Amendment search 
for evidence of criminality or for contraband but rather are coarse-
screening devices adopted as a convenient substitute for total search 
of all passengers, flight personnel and baggage . . . . Those not 
cleared for boarding are searched not as under positive suspicion or 
as indicated by probable cause but simply because they are the only 
ones of all those originally and still notionally subject to search who 
have not been cleared for boarding through an unobtrusive but real 
conceptual pat-down.120 
The Terry rationale may have been appropriate in the early 
cases that involved the original multilevel screening process, for 
that system provided some, albeit a low, level of reasonable suspicion 
to justify each successive search.130 Although the profile itself is not 
intrusive enough to be a search, it may provide reasonable suspicion 
to justify the use of the magnetometer, which is a search; the mag-
netometer, in tum, may justify any frisk deemed necessary. This 
analysis, first advanced in Lopez, accepts an extremely low level of 
"reasonable suspicion" by the Terry standard, which required 
"specific and articulable facts," but it may be justified by the par-
ticularly compelling government interest involved. 
A different question is presented by a case, like Epperson, that 
arises under the new search procedures, for under these procedures 
the initial screening by magnetometer is itself a search, yet is not 
supported by reasonable suspicion.131 Epperson found the search 
reasonable on the grounds that the government interest involved is 
compelling and the personal intrusion slight; it claimed that this 
rationale was merely an extension of Terry. However, it must be 
pointed out once more that an essential requirement in Terry was 
that the officer possess a reasonable suspicion, based on specific facts, 
that the person searched is armed and presently dangerous. Magne-
tometer searches do not meet this requirement; they are applied in-
discriminately to all passengers. The newest procedures go even 
further, for they also require that the hand baggage of each passenger 
be searched. Adams v. Williams132 may have relaxed the Terry stan-
dard, but in that case the officer's reasonable suspicion was still di-
rected to a specific individual. In the airport search the objects of 
suspicion are all passengers, the vast majority of whom are unlikely 
to attempt a hijacking. 
129. 352 F. Supp. at 43. 
130. See, e.g., United States v. :Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
991 (1972); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
131. To have grounds for searches in these cases, it would be necessary to assume 
that anyone who wishes to travel by airplane is, by virtue of that fact alone, under 
reasonable suspicion. This argument is similar to one approach used in justifying 
border searches. See Witt v. Uni_ted States, 287 F.2d 389, 891 (9th Cir. 1961). 
132. See text accompanying notes 112-14 supra. 
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If the courts do persist in extending the stop-and-frisk doctrine 
to include airport searches, they will have to reach the question, 
discussed at length in Terry, of the permissible scope of the search. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that even a search that is 
reasonable at its inception may violate fourth amendment protec-
tions if its scope and intensity become intolerable.133 A search must 
be reasonably limited by its objective.134 In the case of the antihi-
jacker searches the objective is the discovery of weapons. The per-
missible scope of airport searches has not been definitively defined 
by the courts that apply Terry to justify them, but there are few 
cases on point. In United States v. Kroll,135 the scope of a search of 
a passenger's briefcase was found to be unreasonably extended, al-
though the general search of hand luggage was justified at the outset. 
In that case, a suspicious marshal searched the contents of an ordi-
nary business envelope that had a very small bulge at one end. The 
court said that it was obvious from the testimony that at the time 
that the marshal asked the defendant to empty the envelope, he was 
searching, not for weapons of any kind, but for the contraband that 
his trained intuition told him was there.136 The court said that this 
went beyond the scope of a reasonable airport search, which is not 
a "license for the wholesale exploration of a passenger's luggage and 
its contents."137 United States v. Meulener,138 in contrast, found 
that any search of hand luggage was unreasonable unless the pas-
senger was first subjected to a frisk.139 The court based its finding 
on Terry, which approved only a limited pat-down as an initial 
step.14° Further intrusions, it said, may be justified only on the basis 
of evidence discovered in the course of the frisk.141 These decisions 
indicate that, even if airport searches are constitutional on the basis 
of Terry, the scope of the present system may be found to be unrea-
sonably broad. 
IV 
The doctrine of implied or express consent has also been relied 
upon to justify antihijacking searches. Because consent to a search 
133. See, e.g., Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957). 
134. Harris v. United States, 151 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1945), afjd., 331 U.S. 145 (1947). 
135. 351 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Mo. 1972), affd., 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973). 
136. 351 F. Supp. at 150. 
137. 351 F. Supp. at 152. 
138. 351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972). 
139. The court also felt that the search was unreasonable because the defendant 
was not given the opportunity to refrain from boarding the aircraft. 
140. 351 F. Supp. at 1292. 
141. But see United States v. Rivera, No. 72 CR 1309, slip op. at 10 (E.D.N.Y., 
May 22, 1973): "[I]he court ought not to second-guess an air-marshal as to the pro-
cedures that should precede a patdown of a passenger who meets the profile and who 
had substantially activated the magnetometer." 
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is a waiver of a fundamental constitutional right, the courts require 
that "[s]uch a waiver or consent ... be proved by clear and positive 
testimony, and . . . that there [be] no duress or coercion, actual or 
implied .... The government must show a consent that is unequiv-
ocal and specific, and freely and intelligently given."142 Mere 
verbal agreement does not create a conclusive presumption of con-
sent.143 Since even the polite request of a uniformed official acting 
under apparently lawful authority may have a coercive effect on the 
average citizen, the courts have held that even such "lawful coer-
cion" will usually invalidate consent or acquiescence to a search.144 
In its last term, the Supreme Court appeared to relax the stan-
dards for establishing an effective consent. In Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte145 the Court refused to accept an argument that its earlier 
cases required that the prosecution's proof of consent to a search 
meet the strict standards of "an intentional relinquishment ... of 
a knmm right.''146 It reasoned that such guarantees as the privilege 
against compulsory sel£-incrimination147 and the right to counsel,148 
which preserve the defendant's right to a fair criminal trial and 
which do require proof of a "knowing and intelligent waiver," are 
of an entirely different order from those rights guaranteed by the 
fourth amendment. The Court found that, since the latter rights are 
not essential to procedural fairness, the requirement of a knowing 
waiver is inappropriate, and a less stringent standard can be used.140 
The Court did not specifically describe what the appropriate stan-
dard would be, but it did state that the defendant's knowledge of his 
right to refuse to be searched is only one factor to be considered in 
determining if the consent was voluntarily given.160 In that case, 
142. Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
143. Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 
826 (1966). 
144. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). 
145. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
146. 412 U.S. at 235-46. 
147. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
148. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
149. Justice Marshall vigorously contested this conclusion in dissent: 
I have difficulty in comprehending how a decision made without knowledge of 
available alternatives can be treated as a choice at all • 
. • • In the final analysis, the Court now sanctions a game of blindman's bluff, 
in which the police always have the upper hand, for the sake of nothing more than 
the convenience of the police. But the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment were 
never intended to shrink before such an ephemeral and changeable interest. The 
Framers of the Fourth Amendment struck the balance against this sort of con• 
venience and in favor of certain basic civil rights. It is not for this Court to 
restrike that balance because of its own views of the needs of law enforcement 
officers. 
412 U.S. at 284, 289-90. 
150. 412 U.S. at 248-49. 
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the search was found to be constitutional when the defendant agreed 
to it verbally, even though it had not been proved that he knew of 
his right to refuse. 
Before Schneckloth, the courts had held, in the few airport search 
cases in which the question was raised, that mere verbal agreement 
was insufficient to provide the necessary express consent.151 But the 
court did find express consent in United States v. Legato,152 where 
the defendant voluntarily allowed his bag to be searched after he 
had been informed of his right to refuse.153 The present airport sys-
tem is unlikely to meet the standards of express consent even after 
Schneckloth, for at no point is the verbal or ·written assent of the 
passenger obtained. 
If the airport procedures were to be altered to obtain express 
consent, the consent should be requested very early, probably at the 
time that the airline ticket is purchased, in order to facilitate refusal 
and allow the making of alternative plans. The ticket should specify, 
in large and prominent type, that consent to be searched is "a con-
dition to passage on this and every other airline."154 Although 
Schneckloth may have made this unnecessary, as a further guarantee 
that consent is made with knowledge the passenger could be pro-
vided with a separate consent form, which explains in specific and 
nontechnical language the rights of the citizen under the fourth 
amendment and the extent to which they are waived by the signing 
of the form.1111; • 
lt has been argued that a passenger who continues the boarding 
process after reading a sign that states, "Passengers and Baggage 
Subject to Search," has impliedly consented to the search. The 
courts before Schneckloth uniformly rejected this suggestion and 
found that at most there was acquiescence to the demands of the 
marshals.156 Even if the courts were to apply the Schneckloth analysis 
151. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. 
Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284 (D.C. Cal. 1972); United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 
749 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
152. 42 U.S.L.W. 2019 (5th Cir., June 14, 1973). 
153. Legato did not arise in the course of the normal airport search. The defendant 
was searched on the basis of an anonymous telephone tip that had warned airline 
officials to watch for a man carrying a bomb in an orange shopping bag. Defendant 
was searched because he was seen carrying an orange shopping bag containing a large 
package. 42 U.S.L.W. at 2019. 
154. See, e.g., Roe v. R.A. Naylor, Ltd., [1917) 1 K.B. 712, where it was held 
that if an important contractual provision is placed in such a position on the docu-
ment that a man of ordinary care and intelligence would not expect to find it there, 
then that condition would not be binding. See generally 2 A. CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 288, 
at 51-52 (1950). 
155. It must be clear to the passenger that the separate consent form is a material 
part of the contract for the ticket. See Jones v. Great Northern Ry., 68 Mont. 231, 
217 P. 673 (1923). See generally 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 548 (rev. ed. 1960). 
156. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1092-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
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to the requirement of proof of knowledge in cases of implied as well 
as express consent, they are not likely to find implied consent in the 
passenger's failure to turn back, for such behavior does not meet the 
requirement, undisturbed by Schneckloth, that consent be specific 
and unequivocal. 
Even if the courts were to find that the obtaining of express 
consent as detailed above provided a valid waiver, it could be argued 
that the passengers are being forced to waive one constitutional 
right, the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, in order 
to exercise another, the right to travel. The Supreme Court has held, 
in other contexts, that the exercise of one constitutional right may 
not be conditioned on the waiver of another.157 However, as dis-
cussed above,158 the courts will probably find that the right to travel 
has not in fact been infringed or that the infringement is permissible 
because of the compelling state interest involved. As one judge has 
noted, "There is no inherent right to travel to a certain place in a 
particular aircraft. Accordingly, airline authorities may condition 
the sale of a ticket or permission to board the airplane upon a per-
son's consent to be searched for weapons, explosives, and the like."1uo 
V 
None of the existing exceptions to the warrant can be success-
fully adapted to validate the airport search system in its present form. 
It might seem to be a relatively easy matter to obtain the consent of 
the passengers in order to bring the procedures within the exception 
for searches authorized by the persons searched. However, even such 
a minor change may make a significant difference in terms of time 
and expense when so many people must be processed, and the incon-
venience to the passengers may actually be increased. Since mere 
verbal assent may cause problems of proof, a written consent will 
probably be necessary. If the consent is to be anything more than 
a mere formality-and especially if pre-Schneckloth standards .are 
applied-the extent of his fourth amendment rights and the full 
import of the waiver must be explained to each passenger. This 
procedure would impose a burden on the processing of passengers 
far greater than the benefit it would confer. 
Rather than imposing such a burden merely to fit airport searches 
into an existing exemption to the warrant requirement, the courts 
should create a new exception that would cover airport procedures 
157. See, e.g., Dunn v. :Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972). 
158. See text accompanying notes 29-42 supra. But see United States v. Lopez, 328 
F. Supp. 1077, 1093 (E.D.N.Y. 1971): "Nor can the government properly argue that 
it can condition the exercise of the defendant's constitutional right to travel on the 
voluntary relinquishment of his Fourth Amendment rights." 
159. United States v. Fern, No. 72-1284, slip op. at 7 (7th Cir., Sept. 20, 1973) 
(Gordon, J., dissenting). 
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as they now exist.160 Even if the present 'procedures are not con-
sidered inviolate, creating a special exception-rather than adapting 
the system to meet the standards for proper consent-would allow 
the courts to deal specifically with the unique problems of airport 
searches in answering certain questions, such as what is the permis-
sible scope of the search, 161 whether there is a need for consent and 
what sort of consent is required, and whether the search can be 
avoided, once one has reached the point at which the search is to be 
performed, by choosing not to board the aircraft.162 The interests of 
the passenger could be accommodated to the greatest degree possible 
consistent with the government's interest, for the courts could see 
that the searches were no more intrusive than is reasonably necessary 
under the specific circumstances, rather than holding them to stan-
dards formulated for other situations. Defining a new exception to 
the warrant requirement would also preserve the integrity of the 
existing exceptions, for it would avoid extending them beyond their 
initial justifications to cover an entirely new fact situation. 
There have already been guarded suggestions that a new excep-
tion for airport searches would be appropriate.163 In United States 
v. Moreno,164 for example, the court upheld a warrantless airport 
search and declared that "[ d]ue to the gravity of the air piracy prob-
lem, we think that the airport ... is a critical zone in which special 
fourth amendment considerations apply."165 
It could be argued that creating yet another exception would 
seriously undercut the fourth amendment, a process at least as dan-
gerous as stretching the current exceptions too far. However, the 
160. As of the end of its 1973 Term, the Supreme Court had not granted certiorari 
in any airport search cases. See, e.g., United States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 
1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3195 (U.S., Oct. 9, 1973); United States v. Riggs, 474 
F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S., Oct. 9, 1973); United 
States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972); United States 
v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972); United States v. 
Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972). However, as 
the flood of cases continues and the disagreements between the circuits become more 
pronounced, it is to be hoped that the Court will soon hear a case in this area. 
161. See United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1291-92 (C.D. Cal. 1972). 
162. See United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1289-91 (C.D. Cal. 1972). 
163. To date, however, these suggestions have been inferential rather than direct, 
as the courts have been mainly concerned with fitting airport searches into existing 
case law. In one early case, the court justified an airport search as an extension of 
the Terry rule but stated that "in the context of a possible .airplane hijacking with 
the enormous consequences which may flow therefrom, and in .vie,v of the limited 
time in which [the marshal] had to act, the level of suspicion required for a Terry 
investigative stop and protective search should be lowered." United States v. Lindsey, 
451 F.2d 701, 703 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972). See also United 
States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972), 
discussed in text accompanying notes 122-24 supra. 
164. 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973). 
165. 475 F.2d at 51. 
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exception would be to the warrant requirement, not to the fourth 
amendment. It must be remembered that "what the Constitution 
forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches 
and seizures."166 In framihg a new exception the Court would merely 
be determining that in the special circumstances a search is reason-
able without a search warrant or a demonstration of probable cause. 
The Court adopts a balancing analysis167 to determine whether 
to exempt a certain kind of search from the warrant requirement. 
Three factors are typically weighed: the nature and strength of the 
government's need to search, the seriousness of the special enforce-
ment problems involved, and the degree of intrusion that the search 
would entail. 
In considering the government's need to search, the Court has 
felt that a police officer's ·need to protect himself in an immediately 
dangerous situation is a sufficient justification for the stop-and-frisk 
doctrine. In administrative searches, the government's need to per-
form fire and health inspections is not as immediately compelling, and 
thus a warrant is generally required. The urgent need to prevent 
airplane hijackings, which place large numbers of citizens in serious 
danger, can cost millions of dollars in loss of equipment or in ran-
som money, and may have serious international effects, would 
seem to fall in the former category. 
With regard to enforcement problems, the Court has regularly 
refused to approve a warrantless search simply because it was more 
convenient for the police. However, "in applying the Fourth Amend-
ment, the Court has seldom shown itself unaware of the practical 
demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement."168 
Most of the current exceptions to the warrant requirement are 
grounded in special circumstances in which requiring a warrant 
would be unreasonable because it would frustrate the purpose of 
the search. For example, in the traditional stop-and-frisk situation, 
where the lives of police officers or bystanders might be in imme-
diate danger, it would be unreasonable to require that a warrant be 
obtained and traditional probable cause be established; rather, it is 
the duty of the officer to disarm the suspect and thus remove the 
immediate danger before proceeding any further.100 Likewise, in 
the administrative search cases it would be difficult, if not impossible, 
to establish that there was sufficient probable cause to believe that 
code violations existed in a particular building without first search-
ing that building. 170 Therefore, the courts are allowed to consider 
166. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). 
167. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967). 
168. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). 
169. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968). , 
170. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1967). 
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the general character of the neighborhood in deciding if probable 
cause exists. Those making airport searches are under similar time 
and investigatory constraints. They must pass upon a great number 
of people in a very short period of time, and the variety of possible 
hijackers plus their increasing inventiveness in hiding weapons and 
explosives makes the task increasingly difficult. Since the potential 
hijacker must be stopped· before he can board the aircraft and 
threaten harm to other travelers, there is no time for the officer to 
establish probable cause or to obtain a search warrant without de-
taining either the plane or the suspect passenger. 
· Against the government's need to search and the special enforce-
ment problems, the Court will balance the degree of intrusion that 
the search entails:171 Is the scope of the search so broad, even when 
it is limited as much as possible consistent with its purpose, that the 
invasion of privacy outweighs opposing interests? In Terry a pat-
down of the suspect's outer clothing was found to be both adequate 
to remove the possible danger and sufficiently unintrusive. The use 
of a magnetometer would seem to be less offensive than a patdown. 
The search of carry-on luggage does go farther, but the passenger 
has the option of checking all of his baggage and thus not having 
it searched. Furthermore, ·since everyone who boards an aircraft will 
be searched for weapons,172 the passenger who is searched is not 
singled out for special and unexpected treatment and should there-
fore feel no particular embarrassment or discomfort. 
If the courts feel that the intrusion caused by the present airport 
system goes only so far as is absolutely necessary to effect the purpose 
of the search, they are likely to find that the creation of a new excep-
tion to the warrant· requirement is appropriate. However, the fact 
that fewer than nventy per cent of the arrests resulting from the 
current search system have involved crimes related to hijacking173 
may indicate that the system now in use is unnecessarily broad. The 
suspicions that those conducting the searches are, at least in some 
cases, using them as a pretext to uncover evidence of other crimes is 
inevitable.174 The use of the system for fishing expeditions would 
171. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723, 729 (2d Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 
(1972); United States v. Rivera, 72 CR 1309, slip 9p. at IO (E.D.N.Y., May 22, 1973). 
172. See note 12 supra. New York Times, Nov. 1971, at I, col. 3 (late city ed.). 
173. See note 6 supra. 
174. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38, 43-44 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), 
where the court noted that if a defendant can offer any evidence that the search in 
his case was not actually directed entirely towards discovering weapons, the court 
will carefully examine the circumstances of the search. In United States v. Kroll, 
351 F; Supp. 148 (W.D. Mo. 1972), affd., 481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973), the court refused 
to admit the amphetamines discovered in defendant's briefcase during an airport 
search. Although the search was justified at its inception, the marshal went beyond 
its permissible scope and intensity when he searched a regular business envelope, 
which could not have concealed a weapon, and discovered the drugs. 
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be especially abusive in view of the vast number of citizens to which 
it is applied. 
Judge Aldrich, dissenting in United States v. Skipwith,17G has sug-
gested that a new exclusionary rule be devised for airport searches. 
Judge Aldrich would exclude "extraneous materials [such as drugs] 
not within the purpose of the search, but fortuitously discovered in 
the passenger's possession, to support a criminal prosecution."170 
Only weapons and explosives that could be used in hijacking an 
airplane would be admissible, although the search itself would be 
authorized. Judge Aldrich argued that such a rule would remove the 
incentive for overzealous law officers to misuse the procedure with-
out impairing the prevention of hijacking and would thus "guaran-
tee to the public that the government is not using airport search 
procedure for other purposes, an offensive thought to any innocent 
person suffering the inconvenience."177 
At least one state has already imposed a similar exclusionary 
rule by statute.178 In an Illinois act making it a crime to board an 
aircraft with a firearm, explosive, or lethal weapon,179 it is stipulated 
that "any evidence of criminal activity found during [an airport] 
search" ·will be admissible only for the purpose of establishing a 
violation of that act.180 Evidence discovered in the course of an air-
port search "is inadmissible as evidence in any legal proceeding for 
any other purpose."181 
The enactment of such legislation ensures that, as a matter of 
public policy, the search system will be used only to prevent possible 
hijackings. When such legislation exists, the courts may be more 
likely to create a special exception to the warrant requirement, for 
the degree of intrusion might be reduced. It is unlikely, however, 
that the courts will themselves create a new exclusionary rule in the 
absence of legislation. They may be deterred by the fear that many 
people caught with contraband would not be prosecuted for a 
crime that they had clearly committed. However, in other cases the 
inability to prosecute guilty individuals has been found to be an 
acceptable price to pay for the preservation of an important consti-
tutional right.182 
175. No. 72-1932, slip op. at 17-21 (5th Cir., June 14, 1973). 
176. No. 72-1932, slip op. at 17-18. 
177. No. 72-1932, slip op. at 20. 
178. Also, at least one commentator suggested a similar special extension of the 
exclusionary rule soon after the Terry decision. He advocated the exclusion from 
evidence of all contraband except weapons discovered during a frisk. Note, The 
Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. R.Ev. 63, 185-86 (1968). 
179. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 84-1 to -7 (Smith-Hurd 1970), as amended, ILL. ANN. 
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 84-6 to -7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973). 
180. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 84-4 (Smith-Hurd 1970). 
181. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 84-4 (Smith-Hurd 1970). 
182. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960) (evidence seized in 
violation of fourth amendment by state officers cannot be used in federal prosecution), 
November 1973]
A much more significant deterrent to a court-created rule is the
fact that the suggested rule would be a significant extension of
the present exclusionary rule. The "plain view" doctrine now per.
mits the admission of any evidence unexpectedly discovered in the
normal course of an otherwise legal search,183 while the "exclusionary
rule" in its present form bars the admission only of evidence dis-
covered in the course of a search that is itself illegal.184 The exclu
sion of only some of the evidence discovered in a legal search, as
the Shipwith dissent suggests, would be a dramatic extension of the
present rule. Moreover, the suggested rule, unlike the existing rule,
would not be related to the preservation of judicial integrity. As one
of its major purposes, the existing rule refuses to make the courts a
"party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens." 1 5
No such invasion would exist in airport cases if, as is suggested, the
search itself is justified. It is true that the suggested rule might
share the rationale of the present rule in that it deters the misuse of
the search procedure. However, the effectiveness of even the present
rule in deterring misuse has been called into question: "[I]t can be
fairly said of the Exclusionary Rule that it cannot be proved to have
a significant deterrent effect and this effect is not so inherently
likely that we can assume it to exist in the absence of proof."'8s6 In
a time when the value of the present rule is increasingly called into
question, it seems unlikely that the courts will extend it as suggested.
Rather, the courts should find that the present airport search system
is sufficiently unintrusive to allow the creation of a new exception
to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment in the light
of the compelling government interest in preventing airplane hi-
jackings.
183. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S.
217 (1960).
184. No. 72-1932, slip op. at 11.
185. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
186. Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L.
Rav. 736, 741 (1972). From the point of view of a defendant, deterrence may seem
irrelevant. He is interested in avoiding incarceration and the rule allows him to do so.
Notes
